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Abstract
After the infamous attacks of September 11 in 2001, air transportation security has been
made the top priority of policymaking agenda by government agencies, particularly the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). While security measures of commercial airports have
been improved dramatically, FAA FAR 139 Class IV non-commercial airports remain somewhat
ignored, as there is a minimal security requirement. In fact, the security of non-commercial or
general aviation airports is equally critical because large transport category aircraft (TCA), such
as Boeing 737- 800, intermittently operate out of some of these airports. For instance, many
NCAA member universities charter large TCA at GA airports carrying athletics, staff, luggage
and equipment to and from various destinations. While terrorist attacks on a large TCA at a Class
IV non-commercial airport has never happened, the lack of adequate security measures could
invite potential terrorists to take advantage of an airport’s insufficient security measure. This
project uses Delphi methodology in conjunction with a series of surveys and observations on GA
airports that do not serve commercial air carriers but, from time to time, accommodate large
TCA for NCAA member universities. This research yields a list of possible airport
vulnerabilities when large aircraft are present, followed by security recommendations to mitigate
the potential risk.
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Introduction
Aviation security has changed significantly since 9/11. Before 9/11, security checkpoints
and equipment were in place to primarily look for bombs, not hijackers. Passenger screening
allowed small sharp articles like cardboard cutters or nail clippers to be carried onboard aircraft.
Inspections fell upon the airport and airlines to hire and staff security personnel for screening
luggage and passengers. These duties were often contracted out to private security firms. The
FAA’s main role was to provide information concerning threats, establish policies, conduct
audits of the airports and airlines, develop new technologies, supervise new equipment
installation at airports, etc. On aircraft, only a small thin door secured the cockpit. Federal air
marshals were rarely onboard and thus could not effectively intervene in the event of a severe
disturbance once airborne. The FAA approved Common Strategy tactic dealt with disruptive
behavior, physically abusive behavior, life-threatening behavior, and attempted or actual breach
of flight deck, and was used by the airlines as a means of assessing threats while crews were
trained to comply with the demands of the hijackers (Harrison 2008).
Literature Review
On the fateful day of September 11th, 2001, four aircraft were hijacked successfully by men with
small box cutters. These terrorists were able to make their way into the cockpit by sheer force
and the flight crew’s offered minimal resistance based on the FAA’s Common Strategy guidance.
Three of those planes were used as large missiles to crash into the World Trade Center and
Pentagon. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (i.e. the 9/11
Commission) was tasked with determining what exactly occurred on that fateful day and to
provide recommendations to prevent another tragedy from occurring again. As suggested by the
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report, the TSA must implement a multi-layered security system that takes into consideration the
full array of possible terrorist tactics. The 9/11 Commission noted that these, “various layers of
security must each be effective in their own right and must be coordinated with other layers in a
manner that creates redundancies to catch possible security lapses” (Elias 2004, p. 3). As a result,
new security rules and programs were introduced to the industry.
Commercial Airport Security
The security laws and associated mechanisms for commercial or major airports are practical and
have been dramatically improved since 9/11. In the U.S., commercial airports operate routine
revenue flights for passengers, cargo or both and are regulated by Title 49 Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) Chapter XII, part 1540– 1562. The FAA FAR Part 139, Class IV noncommercial airports are exempt due to only serving unscheduled passenger operations of large
air carrier aircraft (GAO 2009). There are also other recommended security programs in addition
to the aforementioned security rules for airports and air carriers to conduct passenger and cargo
security checks. For instance, Aviation Direct Access Screening Program (ADASP) requires all
employees to possess an identification badge for access to secured/sterile areas and properties,
Air Operations Areas (AOAs), aircraft, or cargo. The Visual Intermodal Prevention and
Response (VIPR) based on the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 expands security power outside
airport terminals, mainly for the detection of explosives, weapons or possible terrorist activities
(DHS OIG 2007; Price and Forrest 2009).
Pursuant to security rules, Title 49 CFR 1542 Airport Security, CFR 1544 Security for
Air Carriers and Scheduled Operators and CFR 1546 Security for Foreign Air Carriers are the
primary sections for air commerce safety. Title 49 CFR 1542, 1544, and 1546 regulate
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commercial airports, scheduled and charter air carriers using aircraft weighted of more MTOW
12,500 lbs. must possess security measures and screenings on passengers, luggage, and cargo.
Each airport that regularly provides service for scheduled commercial aircraft operators must
enact CFR 1542 airport security program in conjunction with CFR 1544 for US-based air
carriers/commercial operators and CFR 1546 for foreign air carriers. Airports and individual who
receive a Security Directive or Information Circular must also comply with the security rules of
CFR 1542 including: 1) qualified airport security coordinator(s) (ASCs), 2) allowing TSA’s
security inspection, and 3) all general security measures upon cargo and passengers. For aircraft
with a maximum takeoff weight (MTOW) greater than 100,000 lbs., the security measures for air
carriers include: metal detection devices, x-Ray system, security coordinators, law enforcement
personnel accessible weapons, criminal history background checks, training for security
coordinators, training for individuals with security duties, bomb or air piracy threats security
directives and the compliance of subpart E of Title 49 CFR Part 149 Screener Qualifications.
In addition, in Title 49 CFR 1550 Aircraft Security under General Operating and Flight
Rules, part 1550.3 allows TSA security inspection in compliance with 49 CFR 1520 (for Air
Carriers and Commercial Operators) and 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII (rules of Air Commerce and
Safety). Title 49 CFR 1550.5 regulates the activities around the Airport Sterile Area. This
requires an aircraft search and passenger, crewmember, other individuals and their accessible
property (carry-on items) to be screened before boarding in accordance with security procedures
approved by TSA. CFR 1550.5 affects non-commercial carriers or aircraft operators that are
more likely to be corporate operators or private aircraft owners (GPO 2008, p. 377). According
to CFR 1550.5(b) operations not falling into the rules of CFR 1544 and 1546 must follow CFR
1550 if passengers, crewmembers, or other individuals are enplaned from or deplaned into a
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sterile area. Air carriers are required to complete this security requirement. Specifically, they
must conduct a search of the aircraft, screen passengers, crewmembers, and other individuals and
their accessible property (carry-on items) before boarding in accordance with security procedures
approved by TSA. CFR 1550 also extends to aircraft of 12,500 lbs. or more and states: “(a) ...
each aircraft operation conducted in an aircraft with a maximum certificated takeoff weight of
12,500 lbs. or more except for those operations specified in CFR 1550.5 and those operations
conducted under a security program under part 1544 or 1546 of this chapter” should “conduct a
search of the aircraft before departure and screen passengers, crewmembers, and other persons
and their accessible property (carry-on items) before boarding in accordance with security
procedures approved by TSA” (GPO 2008, p.377). Therefore, if an aircraft with a MTOW of
greater than 12,500 lbs. is operated at a Sterile Area of an airport, it is the air carrier, not the
airport, who should also comply with the security rules of 1544 and 1546 for commercial
operators. Most interestingly, FAA FAR 139 Class IV non-commercial airports do not
necessarily need to define Sterile Areas or AOAs and therefore there is no need for GA airports
to comply with the aforementioned laws.
Current GA Mandatory Security Programs
While there are safety considerations at GA airports to minimize the risk of inadvertent access to
the runway and AOA in order to separate the public from aircraft there is no security rules for
FAR 139 Class IV airports. Although there is no security requirement for GA airports, there are
several mandatory security programs for airport users such as charter carriers, or corporate
aviation operators as regulated in CFR 1544.101(d) Twelve-Five Standard Security Program,
part 1544.101(f) Private Charter Program (GPO 2008, p. 333), DCA Access Standard Security
Program, and the Maryland-Three Program.
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Private Charter Security Safety Program (PCSSP)
The PCSSP is applicable to private charters for passenger service using aircraft with
MTOW of 45,500 kg (100,309.3 lbs.), or with a passenger-seating configuration of 61 or more.
The security requirements are similar to scheduled air carriers, which include metal detection
devices, X-ray systems, security coordinators, law enforcement personnel, accessible weapons,
criminal history record checks, training for security coordinators and crewmembers, training for
individuals with security-related duties, bomb or air piracy threats, security directives, and all of
subpart E of 49 CFR Part 1544. The PCSSP includes the mandatory security items under
1544.201, .207, .209, .211, .215, .217, .219, .225, .229, .230, .233, .235, 303, and 305. Yet,
aircraft weighing more than 12,500 lbs. are required to follow Twelve-Five Security Standard
Program (GPO 2008, p.333; NBAA 2005). These security requirements are done by air carriers
not the airports.
Twelve-five Security Standard Program (TFSSP)
The TFSSP was initially published by the TSA in 2002 in the hope to regulate scheduled
air carriers and charters operating aircraft of more than 12,500 lbs. MTOW per se. The TFSSP
“is applicable to scheduled and charter (passenger and cargo) operations to, from, within, or
outside the United States that use aircraft with a maximum certificated takeoff weight (MTOW)
of more than 12,500 lbs.” (GPO 2008, p.332). Security measures under TFSSP include: flight
crews’ criminal history check (CHRC), baggage screening, passenger identification, restricted
access to flight deck etc. (GPO 2008, p.333). The TFSSP contains security items under
1544.217, .219, .223, .230, .235, .237, .301(a)(b), .303, .305 (p.333). In 2004, aircraft weighing
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12,500 lbs. or less were excluded from TFSSP (DHS OIG 2009; NBAA 2005). Again, air
carriers, not the airports, fulfill these security requirements.
DCA Access Standard Security Program (DASSP)
The DCA Access Standard Security Program (DCASSP) was announced by the TSA on
July 19, 2005 to allow general aviation access to DC Ronald Reagan Airport via application and
TSA’s approval. There are three formats of GA operations that can apply to access DCA
including: Aircraft with passenger seats more than 31 but less than 60 can apply under 49 CFR
1544.101(b), heavy operators under TSA’s approval based on 49 CFR 1544.101(f), operators
under 49 CFR 1544.101(d) with TSA’s approval of TFSSP, and corporate aircraft owned and
operated by the company (DHS OIG 2009; GPO 2005; NBAA 2009a, b).
Maryland-three Program
Because Washington D.C. Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and Flight Restricted
Zone (FRZ) are mandatory for all aircraft, the Maryland-Three Program was established to allow
pilots to fly to or from these general aviation airports within the ADIZ (TSA 2010). These
airports include: College Park (CGS), Potomac Airfield (VKX) and Hyde Executive Field (W32).
Not only do these airports conduct flight training, but also provide corporate aviation and charter
services. In this case, PCSSP and DASSP are mandatory (DHS OIG 2009; TSA 2010).
Non-commercial Airport Security
There currently is no security rules associated with GA or FAA FAR 139 Class IV noncommercial airports (no scheduled commercial services for cargo or passengers). From the list of
TSA’s GA security priorities, smuggling (illegal drugs, goods, and immigrants), flight training
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and aircraft theft are their three main concerns. The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
(AOPA) and the TSA collaboratively designed and currently promote the Airport Watch
program. This program not only provides security education to airport personnel and aircraft
operators, but also equips warning signs and conducts student pilot background checks. The GA
Aviation Vulnerability Identification Self-Assessment Tool (GA-VISAT) allows GA airports to
discover internal security weaknesses. Yet GA-VISAT is a voluntary online evaluation tool and
is not available as the time of this study. Depending on the category of operation, GA airport
security relies completely on air carriers or charters. Even though FAA FAR 139 Class IV noncommercial airports do not have any mandatory security programs, they are encouraged to
provide their own suitable security program such as TSA’s Security Guidelines for GA Airports.
Security Guidelines for GA Airports
The Security Guidelines for GA Airports provides security information about personnel,
aircraft, airport facilities, surveillance equipment, security plan items and designs, and special
security events. The Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) believes aircraft operated
around GA airports present low-level threats to the National Airspace System (NAS) due to the
size, payload and characteristics of the aircraft. Therefore, the security plans imposed on large
commercial airports are not appropriate for GA airport use. Their economic feasibility could not
support such an intensive security requirement (TSA 2004). Although this guideline suggests
basic security measures for GA airports, the Executive Summary states: “The document does not
contain regulatory language nor is it intended to suggest that any recommendations or guidelines
should be considered a mandatory requirement” (TSA 2004, p. iii). This statement simply shows
a list of possible security options for the GA airports, however, there is no punishment for
noncompliance.
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Secure GA
This security program contains basic information and Security Assessment Items (SAIs)
that helps GA operators and FBOs to identify potential security threats to their operation. For
operators, the SAIs includes aircraft security, hangar security, visitors, and suspicious personnel
activities. The GA Airport Watch and Security Hotline 1866-GA-SECURE are also introduced.
For FBOs, the SAIs includes: hangar security measures (ramps, lights and cameras), transit pilots,
suspicious activities and personnel, security coordinator, coordinator security training, and
aircraft security (AOPA 2010).
Secure fixed base operators program (SFBOP)
The voluntary SFBOP program was initiated as an international collaboration between
USA and Ireland for public-private fixed-base operators to check passenger and crew
identification against manifests or eAPIS, providing another layer of security. The information
for the flight includes the flight itinerary, names of flight crewmembers and aircraft operator,
aircraft tail number and model (excluding the identification of the passengers onboard) (DHS
OIG 2009).
Large aircraft security program (LASP)
The LASP was proposed under the TSA’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)
outlined in the Federal Register Vol. 73, issue 211 on October 30, 2008 wanting to mandate
airports, private charter or corporate aircraft weighing more than 12,500 lbs. to install TSAapproved security programs. The security program for aircraft, if MTOW is more than 12,500
lbs., security should include: 1) flight crew’s CHRC, 2) Watch-List matching, and 3) biennial
audit via third-party groups. For aircraft weighing more than 100,309 MTOW, additional
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security checks should include passenger check. This program was under the NPRM
announcement soliciting external comments. Airports conducting regular charter services in this
area should provide security programs helping air carriers conduct a thorough security check
using Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program (AOSSP) (TSA 2008).
While there is no security requirement for the FAA FAR 139 Class IV non- commercial
airports, it does not say that there is no vulnerability associated with GA airport operations that
could lead to mishaps, fatalities, or accidents. In 2007, Jeremy Rogalski published a report
concerning Houston area GA airport security. In his report, he outlined numerous GA security
gaps. Mr. Rogalski was able to freely access the airport ramp through a secured gate via the
intercom. He then walked up and touched a Comair regional jet located on an unsecured ramp.
The airport was also found to have no fence in a section of the perimeter (Rogalski 2009). These
regional jets may not be used to crash into large buildings due to their diminutive size, but could
be used to crash into chemical plants and their respective storage tanks causing massive damage,
casualties or injuries (Rogalski 2009).
Research Questions
Although there are no mandatory security programs for FAA FAR 139 Class IV noncommercial airports, large aircraft do use these airports for charter services, such as NCAA
member universities who use GA airports nearby universities to transport athletics and
equipment. While the H.R. 3093 General Aviation Security Enhancement Act 2009 has been
introduced by Congress and the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) of Large Aircraft
Security Program (LASP) is under discussion as of the date of this study, the purpose of this
study aims to answer two important questions:
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1. Without mandatory security enforcement, what is (are) the security measure(s) implemented
by the FAA FAR 139 Class IV non-commercial airports when a large charter airliner is present?
2. While there is no mandatory security program or rule for FAA FAR 139 Class IV noncommercial airports, what could be the vulnerability affecting airport security when a large
charter airliner is present?
Research Methodology
This study applies a two-stage process: Stage-1 onsite field study, observations and a
personal interview and Stage-2 an online survey to selected airports for inputs and verification.
To discover the possible security vulnerabilities of GA airports accommodating large aircraft, a
field study and several onsite observations on a GA airport used by a NCAA University during
passenger boarding/deplaning process was conducted. The finding from Stage-1 yielded a basis
of questionnaire (See Appendix A) in conjunction with the findings extracted from
Transportation Research Board (TRB) Airport Cooperation Research Program (ACRP) Synthesis
Report 3 (TRB 2007) and related literature reviews. During the Stage-2 survey, the FAA FAR
139 Class IV non-commercial airports used by NCAA member universities chartering large
airliners are selected as the research sample. To find all National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) Division I teams throughout the United States, ESPN and NCAA websites were utilized
to retrieve a list of twelve conferences totaling 120 teams. NCAA’s website also provides the
location of each member university. This information was then used in Google maps to
determine the proximity of airports nearby the colleges. For an airport to be listed it must be
within 25 miles of a college and have a minimum runway length of 5,000 feet. Skyvector website
was then used to search for any additional airports around the area of the college by means of a
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sectional aeronautical map. Next, FlightAware and airport websites were used to determine if the
selected airports had routine commercial or only large charter operations. This was an extremely
time-consuming task as FlightAware only had around 2 weeks worth of data available. To
finalize the research sample providing no routine commercial service but occasionally
accommodating large charter aircraft for NACC member universities, airport services were
reviewed during the height of the college football season (September to November) as many
NCAA Division I teams travelled via chartered aircraft. For instance, Pennsylvania State
University uses University Park Airport, which also provides routine commercial operations. In
this case, University Park Airport is not selected, as the security rules of 49 CFR 1544 must be
complied. A total of seven airports were confirmed to have used charters for recent away NCAA
football games in addition to fifteen airports classified as FAR 139 Class IV GA airports without
scheduled airline services. Airport contact information was retrieved from the FAA including
airport manager and owner address, telephone, and airport classification information. Delphi
Technique for data creditability was used.
Findings
To answer the two proposed questions, this section provides two reports including results of
Stage-1 field study and Stage-2 survey.
Stage-1 Findings
Q1. Without mandatory security enforcement, what is (are) the security measure(s) implemented
by FAA FAR 139 Class IV non-commercial airports when a large charter airliner is present?
From the Stage-1 process, the authors audited and conducted onsite observations between
August 2008 and November 2009 when large charter aircraft were present. As it stands, the
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observed airport is a FAA Part 139, Class IV non-commercial airport that is not required to
arrange a sterile area for the embarking/disembarking of its passenger or to define Air Operations
Areas (AOAs) when large charter aircraft are present. Large aircraft like Boeing 737- 800,
Boeing 757, and Airbus 320 aircraft were observed readily accessible from both the airport
terminal and ramp upon arrival and subsequent departure later in the evening from the observed
airport. A private security firm was hired by charter carriers to provide physical screening of
passengers and associated carry- on items by hand-held metal detectors. There was no
observance of large luggage check-in or over-size equipment being screened before being loaded
onto the aircraft cargo bay. There was one police officer in attendance during the operation;
however, no firearms were observed on the officer’s person. It was later learned that one police
officer travels on all flights with the football team for security reasons. It is understood that this
officer did not need to have the prerequisite training to carry a loaded weapon inside the aircraft
cabin per CFR 1544.219 Carriage of Accessible Weapons. Another important observation of the
charter operation shows that athletic players and team managers taking luggage off the conveyor
belt. This is in direct violation of CFR 1544.203,” Each aircraft operator must use the procedures
in its security program to control checked baggage that it accepts for transport on an aircraft, in a
manner that: Prevents access by persons other than an aircraft operator employee or its agent
(GPO 2008).” Also a chartered B737 was left unattended on the ramp overnight. Air stairs were
located approximately 20 feet from the forward left aircraft door. As understood, the B737 does
not have a lock to exterior doors, but does lock the Kevlar cockpit door to prevent unauthorized
access. Catering trucks came through the entrance of the local FBO freely and loaded food and
drinks to the aircraft without inspection. This unsupervised access to the aircraft may allow the
opportunity for unspecified weapons or dangerous substances to be introduced to the aircraft.
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Furthermore, sabotage to aircraft equipment or potential could have occurred. Without a
systematic risk management or regulatory enforcement of security programs, each FAR 139
Class IV airport possesses its own security format to mitigate its particular security challenges.
Although without a regulatory enforcement of security programs, each GA airport possesses its
own security characteristics that may only apply to that particular entity. The authors also
interviewed the airport manager to understand the security measures of the observed airport.
Based on the feedback of the airport manager, the authors had summarized that:
1. The primary activity of the observed towered GA airport is student flight training and
corporate aviation services;
2. NCAA athletic teams like basketball, football, baseball, volleyball, and marching band
chartered Boeing 737-500 (MTOW ≥ 133,500 lbs.), Boeing 757 (MTOW ≥ 220,000 lbs.), Airbus
320 series (MTOW ≥ 130,000 lbs.), Dornier 328Jet (MTOW > 34,500 lbs.) and Embraer 145
(MTOW ≥ 44,000 lbs.) to commute to their destinations for sports conferences from this airport;
3. Military aircraft such as F-18 and T-35 were invited to the airport on a variety of occasions
and remained overnight;
4. A local FBO provides aircraft rental, fuel, catering services and ground supports during the
operation of large charter flights;
5. There is no mandatory security measure enforcing FAA FAR 139 Class IV non-commercial
airports;
6. Charter carriers were responsible for flight operation and security measures (TFSSP and
PCSSP), while the university provided ground transportation to and from the sports complex;

16	
  
	
  
7. Passengers were identified by air carriers with the manifest provided by their group leader and
then checked by pilots; &
8. Private contractors hired by air carriers to conduct passenger screenings;
9. Airport Watch program and a direct monitoring by airport personnel, tower
controllers and tenants were embraced to secure airport operations;
10. The airport is secured by fences around airport perimeters, control of main gate and doors,
and personal observation based on Airport Watch program;
11. There is no emerging security vulnerability at the observed airport;
12. The chance of security breach at the observed airport is very remote; and
13. Additional security efforts and measures would incur extra cost associated with future
operations.
Q2 While there is no mandatory security program or rule for FAA FAR 139 Class IV noncommercial airports, what could be the vulnerability affecting airport security when a large
charter airliner is present?
1. There was no x-ray screening mechanism at the observed airport while loading luggage and
equipment;
2. Airport gates or doors were not properly secured which allowed un-authorized personnel
entering into airport apron when large aircraft were operating on the airside;
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3. Access control system is dissimilar at each entrance to the airport property, which makes
access control complicated;
4. Warning signs attached to airport gates or doors were not in clear view to the public;
5. Passenger manifests were found scattered around the terminal with names of all persons
onboard and their respective seat assignments.
6. Often visiting charter aircraft were unattended and unguarded during periods of darkness;
7. No surveillance system present for the airport grounds or entrances;
8. Security measure was based on routine visual surveillances done by airport staff and air traffic
controllers;
9. Control tower cannot monitor every corner of the airport due to buildings blocking line of
sight;
10. Airport emergency numbers are not posted visibly around all facilities
11. There is no hazardous/suspicious person reporting system for an early security alert; and
12.There is no airport security committee.
Stage-2 findings
The Stage-2 survey result not only concurs with the findings extracted from Stage-1
study but also provides more insights for readers to understand the status of security measures
and vulnerabilities among FAR 139 Class IV airports when accommodating large aircraft.
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Q1. Without mandatory security enforcement, what is (are) the security measure(s) implemented
by the FAA FAR 139 Class IV non-commercial airports when a large charter airliner is present?
Within the past 12 months, there were twelve surveyed airports that hosted large aircraft
(MTOW> 100,309 lbs.) chartered by universities. The aircraft included; B727, B737, B757,
B767, A319, A320, A330, DC-9, MD-83, and C130. While embarking and disembarking
passengers and freight, only eight airports provide surveillance by law enforcement personnel,
TSA officers, airport/FBO staffers, security contractors, or security cameras. The security
process also covers luggage screening; however, only 50% of all screened luggage was kept in a
sterile environment before being placed on the aircraft. Pilots and flight attendants, FBO workers,
airport employees, or passengers themselves moved the luggage and freight. Most surveyed
airports are fenced with gated access controls and do have an official security program. When
security programs were developed, the resources were obtained from government (DoT, TSA,
and FAA), trade organizations (AAAE, NBAA, AOPA, and NATA), local law enforcement and
fire department. The airport security program is shared with or supported by airport tenants such
as FBOs, local fire department, State DoT, ATC, TSA, etc. Most surveyed airports participate in
AOPA’s Airport Watch program; yet four surveyed airports do not. The AOPA Airport Watch
program is also shared by all airport tenants, FBOs, pilots, law enforcement, emergency response
groups or fire department, and ATC. Only eight of the fifteen airports with the security program
indicated increased security response to DHS threat escalation. Only 35% of the security
programs had been audited within a year. 20% of the programs had never been audited since
their implementation. Most surveyed airports do have security coordinator, but seven surveyed
respondents do not. While being the airport security coordinator, most also carry different duties
such as emergency medical associate (EMA), an airport manager, airfield operations and
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maintenance, a part of ARFF, or management and administration staff. There are only two
security coordinators serving in the sole capacity. There are fifteen surveyed airports that do
have a security committee, with six surveyed airports having none. The security committee
members are selected from airports, FBO, local law enforcement, TSA and FAA. Only 28% of
airports had a security committee that met regularly. 60% of all airports spent less than $100,000
on security since September 11th, 2001. In the last 2 years that number increased to 85%. For an
emerging security measure requirement for GA airports accommodating large charter aircraft,
the respondents suggested: 1) high tensile electrical security gate, 2) security cameras, 3)
Internet-based surveillance equipment, and 4) full-time security officers. Most airports indicated
the need for CCTV systems at all access points and throughout the airfield.
Q2. While there is no mandatory security program or rule for FAA FAR 139 Class IV noncommercial airports, what could be the vulnerability affecting airport security when a large
charter airliner is present?
1. Some surveyed airports have never completed a security program audit;
2. Four surveyed airports do not participate in any Airport Watch program;
3. Six surveyed airports do not have a security committee;
4. Some surveyed airports’ security response do not increase along with DHS’s threat escalation;
5. Three surveyed airports do not have perimeter fences;
6. While embarking and disembarking passengers, not all surveyed airports provide surveillance
by law enforcement personnel, TSA officers, airport/FBO staffers, security contractors, or
surveillance cameras;

20	
  
	
  
7. Only five surveyed airports have done screening when loading luggage;
8. Occasionally, luggage and freight are moved by passengers themselves;
9. Nine surveyed airports also provide services and facilities to incumbent collegiate aviation
programs. Most educational facilities receive no security audit; and
10. It is almost impossible for charter carriers to implement PCSSP and TWSSP at FAR 139
Class IV airports.
Security Comments
Based on the identified vulnerabilities, the following recommendations should be enacted with
financial assistance from the government:
1. Immediately develop, revise, and audit security programs;
2. Inspect and renew perimeter fences to a regulatory standard;
3. Replace and enlarge warning signs around airport;
4. Form an airport security committee, empowered with sufficient authority and responsibility;
5. All access doors and gates to airside or restricted areas must be immediately controlled and
monitored allowing only authorized personnel to enter;
6. Develop a low-cost metal detector, x-ray machine or screening procedures for luggage and
cargo avoiding hazardous materials (HAZMAT) or prohibited items;
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7. Provide airport security education (hijack history, threat theories, security programs: PCSSP,
TFSSP, SFBOP, and LASP trainings) to local FBOs, catering providers, contractors, airport
workers, passengers, related employees and incumbent collegiate aviation programs;
8. Incorporate municipal or campus police force for passenger protection, ID check, and ground
safety when boarding/deplaning passengers, loading equipment or carry-on luggage using large
jet charters;
9. Ensure security program implementation conducted by charter carriers;
10. Develop aircraft ground monitor or surveillance system that can identify unauthorized
intrusion of an aircraft when unattended;
11. Publish a digital bulletin board broadcasting security information to airport users, workers,
and visitors;
12. Based on Security Management System (SeMS) concept, an airport vulnerability reporting
system should be developed as a proactive security tool;
13. Develop a real-time safety and security protocol based on the risk analysis result from airport
SeMS program;
14. Allocate internal funding to initiate airport security guidelines, measures or programs; and
consult FAA airport district office for possible funding based on Airport Improvement Program
(AIP).
Conclusion
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While concealed explosives could be possibly introduced into an aircraft (e.g. Megrahi’s
bombs on Pan Am Flight 103 on December 21, 1988 or Abdulmutallab’s underwear explosives
on Northwest Flight 253 on December 25, 2009) at a large commercial airport where security
measures are intensive, it could be much easier for al-Qaeda to bypass security checkpoints at a
FAR 139 Class IV airport as security measures are basically non-existing. From time to time, the
operational nature of a FAR 139 Class IV airport is similar to that of FAR 139 Class I, II, and III
airports which provide passenger service and cargo transportation by flying large charter aircraft
such as Boeing 737, 757, 767 and Airbus 330. While potential threats could breach security
measures at FAR 139 Class I, II, and III airports, Class IV airports should also be protected
whenever short-term-high-capacity activities exist. Not only should the implementation of
PCSSP and TFSSP be thoroughly and collaboratively conducted by air carriers, airports, and
FBOs, the low-cost advanced security measures securing airports must be in place. Gate/entrance
control and surveillance systems are urgently required to restrict and screen unauthorized
personnel to access to AOA/restricted areas. Unattended aircraft at unmonitored GA apron (both
day and night) simply presents an easy target for vandalism, theft, or sabotage. Airport security
could not be achieved without the synergy from government, airport authority, airport tenants,
airline operators, passengers and the public and needs to be integrated into the overall
safety/security fabric of the airport professional oversight plan. When large charter aircraft fly in
and out of FAR 139 Class IV airports periodically taking important passengers to and from their
destinations, security measures must be efficiently and effectively elevated and funded by AIP or
possible financial sources. In addition to the short-term-high- capacity activities at FAR 139
Class IV airports often associated with sporting events, the major commercial airports might also
use these airports for safety or security divert airports, so the preplanning for special events
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security enhancements would also facilitate such commercial operation divert planning. The
utilization of GA airports could become more attractive and cost effective. Proactively planning
for the increase in FAR 139 Class IV airport utilization, along with acknowledging the potential
security challenges is a valid business practice as well as a liability and security responsibility.
The potential of security breach leading to a passenger’s injury/fatality, aircraft hijack or facility
damage at a GA airport is remote, but certain peak high value operations significantly increase
their vulnerability and highlight their likelihood. Where security vulnerability exists the industry
must take action to proactively mitigate the threat.
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APPENDIX A
Survey Questionnaire
General Aviation Airport Security Practices
The following questions pertain specifically to general aviation airport security. Please answer all questions, if able,
that are applicable to your airport.
Does the airport have a security program in place?
¨ Yes
¨ No
¨ Unsure
If “yes,” does the security response escalate with DHS threat escalation?
¨ Yes
¨ No
¨ Unsure
If “yes,” who is the plan shared with? (Please check all that apply)
¨ Fixed base operators (FBO)
¨ Local law enforcement
¨ Local fire department
¨ TSA
¨ Unsure
¨ Other (please explain):_________________________________________
Which of the following resources were used to help to develop your program? (Please check all that apply)
¨ None
¨ TSA
¨ DOT
¨ Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA)
¨ National Business Aviation Association (NBAA)
¨ National Air Transportation Association (NATA)
¨ American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE)
¨ Hired consultant
¨ Other (please specify): ______________________________________________________
Is the airport perimeter fenced?
¨ Yes
¨ No
¨ Unsure
If “yes,” how is access within this perimeter granted? (Please check all that apply)
¨ Card readers
¨ Lock and key
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¨ Staffed checkpoints
¨ Escorted access only
¨ No restrictions
¨ Other (please specify):____________________________________
Does the airport have in place an AOPA Airport Watch type of program?
¨ Yes
¨ No
¨ Unsure of that program
If “yes,” who is the plan shared with?
______________________________________________________________________________
Does your organization have an individual designated as the security coordinator?
¨ Yes
¨ No
¨ Unsure
If “yes”, are they assigned other duties?
¨ Yes
¨ No
¨ Unsure
If “yes”, what kind of duties?
__________________________________________________________
¨ Unsure
Is there a security committee that meets regularly in place?
¨ Yes
¨ No
¨ Unsure
If “yes”, which of the list below are represented on the committee?
(Please check all that apply)
¨ Airport staff
¨ FBO
¨ Other tenants
¨ Local police
¨ TSA representatives
¨ FAA officials
¨ Other (please specify):
______________________________________________________
When was the airport security programs last audited?
¨ Less than 1 year
¨ 2-3 years
¨ Greater than three years
¨ Never
¨ Unsure
Please estimate the amount that the airport has spent, in total, on security since September 11, 2009?
¨ Less than $100,000
¨ $100,000 to $500,000
¨ $500,000 to $1 million
¨ More than $1 million
Please estimate the amount that the airport has spent, in total, on security the last two years?
¨ Less than$100,000
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¨ $100,000 to $500,000
¨ $500,000 to $1 million
¨ More than$1 million
Please describe in the space below any unique security ideas, programs, or equipment that have been
implemented/purchased by the organization that have made a positive impact on security at your airport.
______________________________________________________________________________
Irregular Operations with Large Transport Category Aircraft (Maximum Takeoff Weight (MTOW) >
100,300 lbs.)
How many university chartered aircraft of MTOW > 100,300 lbs. (B737, B757, A320, etc.) have used the airport’s
facilities in the past 12 months? (Generally this is an aircraft with more than 61 passenger seats)
¨ 1-2
¨ 3-5
¨ More than 5
¨ Unsure
If any aircraft larger of MTOW > 100,300 lbs. have been used what type were they?
______________________________________________________________________________
Did any of these aircraft remain at the airport overnight?
¨ Yes
¨ No
¨ Unsure
If “yes”, what type of surveillance was used, if any? (Please check all the apply)
¨ Local law enforcement
¨ TSA
¨ Airport Staff
¨ External security agency
¨ Students
¨ Security Cameras
¨ Unsure
¨ None
Are there security personnel or surveillance equipment observing the deplaning/boarding of passengers?
¨ Yes
¨ No
¨ Unsure
If “yes”, what type of surveillance was used, if any? (Please check all the apply)
¨ Local law enforcement
¨ TSA
¨ Airport Staff
¨ External security agency
¨ Students
¨ Security Cameras
¨ Unsure
¨ None
Is luggage screened prior to being place onboard the aircraft?
¨ Yes
¨ No
¨ Unsure
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If “yes”, is the luggage kept in a sterile environment before being loaded on the aircraft?
¨ Yes
¨ No
¨ Unsure
Who is responsible for moving bags and/or cargo in/out of the aircraft?
¨ Pilots\Flight attendants
¨ FBO employees
¨ Airport Employees
¨ Passengers
¨ Unsure
Who is responsible for catering operations in/out of the aircraft?
¨ Pilots\Flight attendants
¨ FBO employees
¨ Airport Employees
¨ Unsure
University Practices
The questions listed below are intended specifically for those colleges or universities that have aviation management
or flight programs. If you do not have any of the programs please continue to respondent information.
Since September 11, 2009 has the university made changes in the curriculum to incorporate changes to security
regulations and operations?
¨ Yes
¨ No
¨ Unsure
If “yes”, does the program receive an audit?
¨ Yes
¨ No
If “yes”, how recently?
¨ Less than 1 year
¨ 2-3 years
¨ More than three years
¨ Unsure
Has the university developed classes tailored specifically to airport security?
¨ Yes
¨ No
¨ Unsure
Does the university have as part of its curriculum classes that are tailored specifically to the needs of general
aviation airports?
¨ Yes
¨ No
¨ Unsure
Has the university worked with surrounding general aviation airports to develop security programs and awareness?
¨ Yes
¨ No
¨ Unsure
Does the university work with airports on internship programs promoting safety and security education?
¨ Yes
¨ No
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¨ Unsure
Respondent Information
Name: ___________________________________________________________
Title: ____________________________________________________________
Airport: __________________________________________________________
Respondent telephone number: _______________________________________
Respondent e-mail address: __________________________________________
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APPENDIX B
Consulted Airports
Airport

State

Airport

State

KAEG

NM

KLAF

IN

KAFW

TX

KLBX

TX

KAHN

GA

KLGU

UT

KAMW

IA

KLRU

NM

KARA

LA

KLWC

KS

KASG

AR

KMDH

IL

KAUO

AL

KMGW

WV

KAVQ

AZ

KMIE

IN

KAWM

AR

KMKC

MO

KBCT

FL

KMOP

MI

KBFM

AL

KMQY

TN

KBKL

OH

KNFW

TX

KBMG

IN

KNQA

TN

KBQR

NY

KOSU

OH

KBTL

MI

KOUN

OK

KBWG

KY

KOWD

MA

KCOE

ID

KPUW

WA

KCPS

IL

KPVU

UT

KCVO

OR

KRBD

TX

KDTO

TX

KRSN

LA

KFOE

KS

KSLE

OR

KFTY

GA

KSTJ

MO

KFYV

AR

KSWO

OK

KFTW

TX

KTCL

AL

KGON

CT

KTOI

AL

KHUF

IN

KUGN

IL

KIAG

NY

KUNV

PA

KIOW

IA

KUOX

MS

KJBR

AR

KVDF

FL

KJNX

NC

KVPZ

IN

KYIP

MI

